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EXPANSION OF FAMILY RIGHTS WHILE
SEARCHING FOR THE MEANING OF LIFE,
INDIVIDUALITY, AND SELF
Saby Ghoshray
How do I love thee? Let me count the ways.
I love thee to the depth and breadth and height
My soul can reach, when out of sight
For the ends of Being and ideal Grace.
I love thee to the level of everday's
Most quiet need, by sun and candle-light.
I love thee freely, as men strive for Right;
I love thee purely, as they turn from Praise.
I love thee with the passion put to use
In my old griefs, and with my childhood's faith.
I love thee with the love I seemed to lose
With my lost saints, - I love thee with the breath,
Smiles, tears, of all my life!--and, if God choose,
I shall but love thee better after death.
- Elizabeth Barrett Browning
Sonnets from the Portuguese (1850) #43
Dr. Ghoshray's main scholarship interest involves searching for equality in the
legal process, looking through the prism of gender, class and ethnicity, which is
echoed in his work on diverse subsets of international law, comparative
constitutionalism, death penalty jurisprudence, law & religion, and gender &
law. He is the author of numerous law review articles and book chapters
including The Dual Rationality of Same-Sex Marriage: Creation of New Rights
in the Shadow of Incomplete Contract Paradigm (forthcoming 2008). The
author would like to thank Jennifer Schulke for her assistance in legal research
and typing of the manuscript. To Shreyoshi and Sayantan, your support is
endless. Warm thanks go to the members of the Santa Clara Law Review
Editorial Board, for their interest and support during the editorial process. Dr.
Ghoshray can be reached at sabyghoshray@sbcglobal.net.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Images of death, destruction, and apocalyptic horrors
describe the 9/11 attacks. These mind numbing images
played out on television screens across the globe. What the
television screens did not capture were the other victims.
These were individuals victimized twice. First, they were
harmed by the actual attacks and then again by a
discriminatory legal landscape. These victims' scars are
made obvious by reviewing a snapshot of their experiences.
On the morning of September 11, 2001, John kissed his
wife, Lisa, goodbye before heading to his job as an office-
cleaner in the World Trade Center's North Tower. Lisa
never heard from her husband again. After searching
frantically for days, Lisa accepted the reality of his
disappearance. She filed for a death certificate and
arranged her husband's memorial service. Lisa received
Workers' Compensation from the state and a small Social
Security death benefit from the federal government. She
contacted John's former employer, who arranged for
receipt of his pension. Because John and Lisa had few
assets, they had never seen the need for a will, nor did
they have the financial means to hire a lawyer to prepare
one. Nonetheless, John's assets, which included a small
savings account, their home, and a car, were given to Lisa
by law.
On that same morning, Juan kissed Miguel, his partner of
21 years, goodbye and headed to his job as a file-clerk in
that same North Tower. Miguel never heard from Juan
again. Miguel applied for Workers' Compensation and
Social Security, but was told he was not eligible for those
benefits because he was not Juan's legal spouse. Even
though Juan and Miguel had taken some precautions to
protect their commitment-such as registering as
domestic partners, designating one another as
beneficiaries on insurance policies, and executing
healthcare proxies and powers of attorney-and even
though Juan paid the same taxes as John, Miguel was not
automatically entitled to any of the compensations given
to Lisa. In addition to his emotional devastation, Miguel
was financially devastated as well.1
1. This tale highlights the very real experiences of many same-sex couples
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John and Lisa's marital status provided access to critical
legal protections and benefits that protected them in their
time of need. In fact, all married couples are entitled to
literally hundreds of rights and protections that permeate
their financial relationship, both in extraordinary
circumstances such as the one mentioned above, or in
everyday matters, like simply renting a car. But, what about
Juan and Miguel, what protection did this couple, living in a
committed relationship spanning over two decades have?
Where were their legal protections and benefits?
Not only did the aftermath of 9/11 witness discrimination
against members of non-heterosexual families, but it also
swept under the carpet the trials and tribulations faced by
those who did not have the protection mechanism of
marriage.2 Marriage invariably brings with it social welfare
protection from certain kinds of adversity, including loss of
income by one spouse via death or disability.3 Unfortunately,
this protection mechanism is not available to all families
living in meaningful relationships, as demonstrated by the
two representative stories showcased above.
Despite the proliferation of diversely variant and
structurally experimental family units,4 family law has not
evolved significantly at the federal level to extend social
welfare protection for all families, regardless of sexual
orientation and gender delineation.5 Family law is premised
who faced additional hardship because they were not recognized as married.
Consider a real example of a same-sex partnership of eleven years. "A gay
California man whose partner died in the September 11th terrorist attacks says
the plight he now faces vividly shows why his home state must allow lesbian
and gay couples to marry. 'Jeff and I got as close to marriage as we could with
our domestic partnership,'" Lambda Legal, Gay Partner of 9/11 Victim Urges
California to Support Freedom to Marry (Feb. 11, 2002),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/gay-partner-of-91 1-victim.html (quoting
Keith Bradkowski). Keith's partner Jeff Collman, was a flight attendant killed
in the attacks. "But it wasn't protection enough, and now I am legally
vulnerable in ways I never imagined." Id.
2. Id.
3. See Alene Russell, Domestic Partnership Benefits: Equity, Fairness, and
Competitive Advantage, in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF STATE COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES POLICY MATrERS 1-7 (2007).
4. See Graham B. Spanier, Vulnerability in the Changing American
Family, Remarks at the National Council on Family Relations Annual
Conference in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Nov. 7, 2007), available at
http://president.psu.edu/speeches/articles/214.html.
5. See Russell, supra note 3.
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on the protection of family unit6 and the maximization of
social welfare,7 which invites a confusing conundrum due to
the evolving conflict of ideologies.5  The conventional
viewpoint hails the father-mother dyad as the basic
functional unit, which must be protected from erosion of
diverging family values. Contrarian viewpoints, however,
emphasize that family formation should neither be dependent
on gender complimentarity, nor should all meaningful
relationships be sanctified by marriage. Against this
backdrop, the time has come to revisit the basic assumptions
of family law and explore whether we must move beyond
heterosexual conjugality and embrace a fundamental
reconstitution of family concept.
Given that family diversity is an irreversible feature of
the post-modern family landscape, we must incorporate an
emerging vision of family premised on the intensity and
quality of relationships. Against this new modality,
meaningful relationships must not be sanctified by marriage
in order for individual members of society to obtain social
welfare protection. True meaning of family should not only
emerge from the concept of marriage, as more and more
6. Consider the findings of a group of twelve diverse U.S. family
scholars: Cohabitation is not the functional equivalent of marriage. As
a group, cohabiters in the United States more closely resemble singles
than married people. Children with cohabiting parents have outcomes
more similar to the children living with single (or remarried) parents
than children from intact marriages. Adults who live together are
more similar to singles than to married couples in terms of physical
health and emotional well-being and mental health, as well as in assets
and earnings .... Couples who live together also, on average, report
relationships of lower quality than do married couples - with
cohabiters reporting more conflict, more violence and lower levels of
satisfaction and commitment. Even biological parents who cohabit
have poorer quality relationships and are more likely to part than
parents who marry. Cohabitation differs from marriage in part
because Americans who choose merely to live together are less
committed to a lifelong relationship.
WILLIAM J. DOHERTY, ET AL., WHY MARRIAGE MATERS: 21 CONCLUSIONS FROM
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 7-8 (Institute for American Values, 2002) (citations
omitted).
7. See generally LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR
MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER AND BETTER OFF
FINANCIALLY (2000).
8. The Dean of Law at Griffith University in Australia, John Dewar notes,
"[Legal theory about the family] has become a confused and tangled terrain of
conflicting ideas and tendencies." John Dewar, Family Law and Its Discontents,
14 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 59, 60 (2000).
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individuals are shifting away from the conventional family
formation while searching for meaningful social relationships.
This drift away from the status quo is giving rise to an array
of evolving family structures. Yet, the legal modalities
remain locked in an eighteenth century puritan concept. The
growing pluralism in family structures, therefore, makes it
incumbent upon society to concede that intimate
relationships cannot be subjected to external regulation by
the state. While same-sex couples are yearning to gain
societal approval for marriage, many other types of
relationships are simply being vilified by society, and as a
result, being ignored by the law. For example, couples
involved in same-sex relationships find it extremely difficult
to raise families, as several states have explicit provisions
against adoption outside of heterosexual relations.'
Similarly, several states impose explicit bans on non-
heterosexual couples enjoying inheritance or survivorship
benefits. ° This has caused harm and hardship to their
alternative families, as they fall outside of the legal
mechanisms granted by marriage."
While the heterosexual conception of marriage finds its
root in social, cultural, and religious-political fundamentals, 2
9. See Nancy G. Maxwell & Caroline J. Forder, The Inadequacies in U.S.
and Dutch Adoption Law to Establish Same-Sex Couples as Legal Parents: A
Call for Recognizing Intentional Parenthood, 38 FAM. L.Q. 623, 662 (2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962774 (highlighting the consequences of
several aspects of adoption laws in the United States and calling for the legal
systems to adopt and implement the concept of intentional parenthood in order
to recognize and protect the parent-child relationship that children in same-
gender relationships enjoy with their non-biological parent); see also Lambda
Legal, Overview of State Adoption Laws, http://www.lambdalegal.orgour-
worklissues/marriage-relationships-family/parenting/overview-of-state-
adoption.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2008) (providing a state by state description
of the status of non-heterosexual adoption in the U.S.).
10. See Evan Wolfson, E-Journal: For Richer, For Poorer: Same-Sex Couples
and the Freedom to Marry as a Civil Right (June 2, 2003),
http://www.drummajorinstitute.org/library/article.php?ID=5518.
11. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE:
FOR BETTER OF FOR WORSE? WHAT WE'VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 9
(2006); see also Center for Policy Alternatives, Marriage Equality: State and
Federal Laws Discriminate Against Same-sex Couples, (2007),
http://www.stateaction.org/issues/issue.cfmissue/MarriageEquality.xml.
12. Historically there have been a variety of reasons for society to promote
the institution of marriage. Often however, many reasons are overlooked, as
marriage is inevitably linked with only religious connotations. But:
Marriage is frequently characterized as a religious institution laden
with old prejudices. It is true that Judaism and Christianity have
2008] 963
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non-heterosexual family styles based on diversity of sexual
preferences have become de facto relationship norms for
some.'3 Just as the decision to get married is an intensely
personal choice, so is the desire to live in a non-marital de-
facto partnership relationship.14  These non-marital
relationships are predicated upon variations of socio-economic
factors,' 5 conceptualized through various progressive liberal
contributed much to the Western understanding of marriage. But it is
also true that they absorbed parts of the secular marital codes of Greek
law, Aristotelian philosophy, Roman law and German law. Even in
ancient secular systems, legal marriage was seen as a way to help
society regulate and achieve a complex set of desires and goals: sexual
activity, procreation, mutual help and affection, and parental care and
accountability. Integrating these classic goods into the institution of
marriage was a task for law, religion and other socializing elements of
society. And although the religious language of sacrament and
covenant adds weight to the law of marriage, each of the goods of
marriage can be identified independently of the religious symbols that
give them depth.
See Don Browning & Elizabeth Marquardt, A Marriage Made in History?,
N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.americanvalues.orglhtml/marriage-history.html; see also Maggie
Gallagher, What is Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA.
L. REV. 773 (2002).
13. See Margie Mason, Census Figures on Same-Sex Couples (Aug. 8, 2001),
http://speakout.com/activism/apstories/10044-1.html; see generally U.S. Census
Bureau, America's Families and Living Arrangements: 2004, tbl.UC1-UC3,
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-
famlcps2004.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2008) (providing further census
statistics from 2004).
14. A de facto relationship is a relationship between two people who live
together but are not married. It does not matter whether the couple are
heterosexual (opposite-sex) or same-sex. The law regarding the division of
property at the end of a de facto relationship is based on territory law, which is
different from the law that applies to married couples. The de facto relationship
has not been incorporated within American legal framework, but promises to be
an efficient accommodation in law to include relationships between men and
women and between same-sex couples. In the Australian legal realm, a
recognizable de facto relationship must come under the definition of a domestic
partnership. De facto relationships include opposite-sex relationships, same-sex
relationships, and companion relationships. Legal Services Commission of
South Australia, What Is a De Facto Relationship?,
http:/www.lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/chl8s06s01.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2008);
see generally, Mary Ann Mason, The Modern American Stepfamily: Problems
and Possibilities, in ALL OUR FAMILIES: NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY
(Mary Ann Mason, Arlene Skolnick & Stephen D. Sugarman, eds., 1998).
15. A recent report by the American Law Institute indicated a strong social
movement towards non-marital social relationships. The report observes:
As the incidence of cohabitation has dramatically increased . . . it has
become increasingly implausible to attribute special significance to the
parties' failure to marry. Domestic partners fail to marry for many
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movements, 16 and emboldened into existence through various
counterculture movements.17  These alternative family
structures have created a set of social relationships which do
not fall under the same degree of state control as traditional
marriages. This non-conformity of social relationships within
the existing legal fabric has shaped American family law in a
direction that is not fully consistent with the free choices and
desires of a significant section of the populace. Extension of
reasons. Among others, some have been unhappy in prior marriages
and therefore wish to avoid the form of marriage, even as they enjoy its
substance with a domestic partner. Some begin a casual relationship
that develops into a durable union, by which time a formal marriage
ceremony may seem awkward or even unnecessary .... Failure to
marry may reflect group mores. Some ethnic and social groups have a
substantially lower incidence of marriage and a substantially higher
incidence of informal domestic relationships than do others. Failure to
marry may also reflect strong social or economic inequality between the
partners, which allows the stronger partner to resist the weaker
partner's preference for marriage. Finally there are domestic partners
who are not allowed to marry each other under state law because they
are of the same sex .... In all of these cases the absence of formal
marriage may have little or no bearing on the intentions of the parties,
the character of the parties' domestic relationship, or the equitable
considerations that underlie claims between lawful spouses at the
dissolution of a marriage.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (2002) (citations omitted).
16. See Julia Wood & Steve Duck, Off the Beaten Track: New Shores for
Relationship Research, in UNDER-STUDIED RELATIONSHIPS: OFF THE BEATEN
TRACK (Julia Wood & Steve Duck eds., 1995); see also BRENDA COSSMAN &
BRUCE RYDER, GAY, LESBIAN AND UNMARRIED HETEROSEXUAL COUPLES AND
THE FAMILY LAW ACT: ACCOMMODATING A DIVERSITY OF FAMILY FORMS 5
(1993).
17. There has been a growing movement calling for dismantling of
traditional marriages, which can be found in recent scholarship. This
scholarship argues that, either marriage should not be restricted to
heterosexual couples, or alternative forms of conjugality must be sanctified by
some recognized norms. These commentators include: See generally, MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Patricia A. Cain, Imagine
There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27 (1996); Paula L. Ettelbrick,
Domestic Partnership, Civil Unions, or Marriage: One Size Does Not Fit All, 64
ALB. L. REV. 905 (2001); Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of
Unmarried People in American Law, 30 AZ. L. REV. 207 (1988); Nancy D.
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,"
79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men
Should Read Martha Fineman, 8 AM. U. J. OF GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 167
(2000); Dianne Post, Why Marriage Should Be Abolished, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 283 (1997).
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rights to these families has been debated while attempting to
irradiate their unequal standing in law through the
constitutional gloss provided by interpretations of suspect
class 8 and equal protection. 9  Yet, the widespread judicial
18. A particular group of people could be considered members of a "suspect
class" if the law categorizes them as suspect, and therefore provides them with
greater judicial scrutiny. In my opinion, the issue of whether to make the
members of the same-sex community a suspect class depends on whether
homosexuality can be considered an immutable behavior or a matter of choice.
Scientific evidence has demonstrated that attraction to members of the same-
sex is in part biologically based, yet the judiciary has historically denied the
"suspect class" status on the homosexuals. Historically, the Supreme Court has
been unwilling to extend "suspect class" status to groups other than women and
racial minorities. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985), the Court refused to make the developmentally disabled a suspect
class. Many commentators have noted, as did Justice Marshall in his partial
concurrence in City of Cleburne that the Court does appear to examine the City
of Cleburne's denial of a permit to a group home for mentally retarded people
with a significantly higher degree of scrutiny than is typically associated with
the rational-basis test. The Court revisited the issue of "suspect class" again in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), where it struck down a Texas statute
prohibiting homosexual sodomy on substantive due process grounds. By taking
resort to the development in the City of Cleburne, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
noted in her concurring opinion that by prohibiting only homosexual sodomy,
and not heterosexual sodomy as well, Texas's statute did not meet rational-
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. I shall emphasize here that
Justice O'Connor may have applied a slightly higher level of scrutiny than mere
rational basis, but the Court as a whole did not really extend suspect-class
status to sexual orientation. In her opinion in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor also
relied on the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which
struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment aimed at denying
homosexuals "minority status, quota preferences, protected status or [a] claim of
discrimination." O'Connor's invocation of Romer is significant as Romer seemed
to employ a markedly higher level of scrutiny than the nominal application of
the rational-basis test. Given the current composition of the Court, it is highly
probable that heightened scrutiny will not be explicitly applied to homosexuals
any time soon, although it may consider the constitutionality of laws prohibiting
the same-sex marriages. It has also been argued that discrimination based on
sex should be interpreted to include discrimination based on sexual orientation,
in which case intermediate scrutiny (higher level of scrutiny than mere rational
basis test) could apply to same-sex rights cases. See Andrew Koppelman, Why
Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 197 (1994). Just recently, the Supreme Court of the state of
Washington went out of its way to declare that members of the homosexual
community are not a minority, that homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic, and finally that homosexuals are not a suspect class. "The
plaintiffs have not established that they are members of a suspect class or that
they have a fundamental right to marriage that includes the right to marry a
person of the same sex." See Anderson v. King County, No. 75934-1, (Wash.
July 26, 2006), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/contentlpdf/759341opn.pdf. Needless to say,
the debate over whether or not members of the same-sex community are a
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prohibitions and legislative impasse continue to stymie the
equal interests of the minorities."
In this article, I go beyond the administrative confines of
family law, and intend to develop a rationale for expanding
social welfare benefits to all families. Delving into the
constitutional core of liberty jurisprudence, I seek to draw
constitutional grants favoring my proposal that social welfare
rights and benefits that emanate from marriage must not be
dependent on a person's sexual preference, or the gender
complimentarity within the individual's family. My article
proceeds in three phases. In the first phase, as presented in
Part II, I draw upon an economic cost-benefit analysis in
order to engage in an expanded abstraction of social outrage
cost. The result is that marriage relationships are
illuminated through a prism of contract paradigm. This in
turn is beneficial, because analysis indicates that economic
rationality neither precludes family types, nor prohibits
individuals from obtaining rights and privileges flowing
through marriage.
In the second phase, drawing from scholarly views on
family, I present the apparent dichotomy of using the
traditional definition, and thus argue for a revision of
viewpoint based on substantive relationship. By straddling
the dual constructs of contractual paradigm and economic
analysis, Part III of my article explores whether the
conception of marriage has a gender bias -or a sexual-
orientation bent, while seeking an efficient avenue between
extracting social cost and regulating intimacy.
Finally, in Part IV, I delve into the deeper meaning of
human existence, individuality and self, to extract
constitutional grants of the legal rights, remedies, and
suspect class is far from being over.
19. The doctrine of "equal protection" states that any law that is otherwise
constitutional, is a valid law and therefore, must be applied equally to all
persons. Sometimes, however, this equal application of law results in
asymmetrical and unequal outcomes for various identifiable groups. A question
that has repeatedly arisen is how to best achieve the intended meaning of
"equal protection" so that everyone is entitled to the same outcome. Relying on
this "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, some jurisdictions
give same-sex spouses the same access to his or her "partner's" company's
health-insurance plan as a spouse in a traditional marriage. However, the
judiciary is still far removed from applying this doctrine universally in
recognizing a same-sex marriage on the same basis as traditional marriage.
20. See Russell, supra note 3.
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consequences surrounding love relationships. In this
exploration, I will engage in an analysis to determine
whether the expansion of rights for those in alternative
families emanate from a deeper meaning of life, existence,
and self.
II. LOOKING THROUGH THE PRISM OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
With the explosion of substantive relationship family
forms21 morphing away from the familiar father-mother
dyad,22 private actions by individuals in creating families
challenge us to examine the consequences of their social
actions. Since family law has not advanced in sync with the
evolution in family forms,23 tracing the roots of such
21. See supra note 17.
22. See Lynn Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of
Constitutional Democracy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 372 (2003) (asserting that
society seeks to maximize its value by incorporating and implementing visions
of a family premised in the traditional concept of marriage as the heterosexual
union between man and woman, who would eventually form the father-mother
dyad as the epicenter of a traditional family).
23. Let us consider this tug of war. In the United States, some states do
provide a variety of benefits to same-sex couples, but have not legalized same-
sex marriages. Delving a little further we find a complex web of state laws that
add to the fog of confusion on the topic of same-sex marriage. For example:
On July 6, 2006, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the New
York state government is not required to allow same-sex marriage,
affirming the constitutionality of a state law limiting marriage to a
man and a woman. On the same day, July 6, 2006, the Supreme Court
of Georgia reinstated constitutional ban on gay marriage. On July 26,
2006, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the state's DOMA was
not unconstitutional and therefore same-sex marriage is an issue
appropriate for the legislature and not the judiciary system. Only
Massachusetts recognizes same-sex marriage, Vermont and
Connecticut offer civil unions, California, New Jersey, Maine and the
District of Columbia grant benefits through domestic partnerships, and
Hawaii has reciprocal beneficiary laws. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme
Court decided Baker v. Vermont (98-032), ruling that their state
legislature must establish identical rights for same-sex couples similar
to those of married opposite-sex couples. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court on November 18, 2003, ruled in the case of Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health (798 N.E.2d 941) that denial of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples violates the state's Equal Protection
Clause.
See Wikipedia, Status of Same-Sex Marriage,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Status-of same-sexmarriage (last visited Mar. 29,
2008).
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inconsistency will require us to explore at a more
fundamental level. Although family law has made discrete
advances at various state levels,24 its collective inadequacy,
especially at the federal level,2 5 has kept same-sex couples,
24. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that limiting
marriage only to opposite-sex couples was unconstitutional, becoming the first
state to allow civil marriages to same-sex couples, although ultimately, the state
Constitution was amended to retain the restriction to marry only for opposite-
sex couples); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that restricting same-sex couples from the privileges of marriage was
unconstitutional, the Court in 2004 also held that civil unions were not
sufficient in meeting the mandate, therefore on May 17, 2004 the state of
Massachusetts was the first in the United States to approve same-sex
marriages.); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (holding that same-sex
couples must receive the same rights and benefits opposite-sex couples were
guaranteed, in December 2006, the Legislature then enacted a civil union
statute to comply with the ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court.); Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that same-sex couples must have the
same benefits that opposite-couples have, thus the Legislature created the civil
union laws to comply with the mandate.).
25. New Jersey residents were positively anticipating the New Jersey
Supreme Court decision as both national and the state opinions in New Jersey
clearly indicate a trend of growing acceptance of same-sex marriage. A recent
study conducted by the University of Pennsylvania showed that when it comes
to the issue of same-sex marriage, many more people support civil unions,
granting unmarried couples many of the legal rights of marriage:
Our research has found that the backlash that followed the
Massachusetts court's decision to allow gay marriage has completely
subsided. The share of the American public supportive of same-sex
marriage has returned to the place it was before the courts got involved
and appears to be on an upward trajectory. During that same period,
an increasing share of the American public became in favor of same-sex
civil unions that fall short of marriage. The same-sex marriage debate
in the courts has moved the national debate and public opinion to the
left on this issue, even if no other state has followed Massachusetts'
lead.
Our conclusion is that because of the court decisions in 2003 and
2004, the debate over same-sex relationships moved to the left, and
civil unions became the middle position.
Dr. Nathaniel Persily, Expert Comment on Same-Sex Marriage in New Jersey,
PENN NEWS, Dec. 21, 2006,
http://www.upenn.edu/pennnews/article.php?id= 1065.
Further, a Star Ledger/Eagleton-Rutgers report states:
September 2003 Poll reveals the following favorable statistics for same-
sex marriage: forty-three percent would allow same-sex couples to
marry, fifty-two percent would allow civil unions, fifty-three percent
would allow legally married same-sex couples from other states who
move to NJ to be recognized as married in NJ, sixt percent thought
same-sex couples should be entitled to health insurance and social
security benefits through their partners.
See American Civil Liberties Union, State Public Opinion from States on Civil
Marriage and Other Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships,
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unmarried cohabitating couples, and individuals in de facto
partnerships 26 outside of the protective umbrella of federal
rights and benefits granted to married couples. Despite
living in meaningful love relationships, individuals other
than heterosexual married couples have been denied
http://www.aclu.org/getequal/ffm/section78/8b4summary.pdf (last visited Mar.
29, 2008).
26. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Darren R. Spedale & Hans
Ytterberg, Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian Registered Partnerships and the Same-
Sex Marriage Debate, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, SINGLE-SEX MARRIAGE
(2004), abstract available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art4.
27. Although, marriages between same-sex couples have not been
recognized officially, there are states that offer something close to that besides
New Jersey. Vermont gives essentially equal treatment to marriage and same-
sex civil unions by the enactment of a law in response to a state court decision
mandating civil unions. Similarly, in 2005, Connecticut enacted a law giving
essentially equal treatment to marriage and same-sex civil unions, thus making
it the first state legislature to enact a civil union law without a court order. In
this context, Connecticut State Insurance Department says that fully insured
health plans are required to treat partners in a civil union the same as spouses
are treated for purposes of health care benefits. See S.B. 963, 2005 Gen.
Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2005), available at
httpJ/hartford.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi=1/XJ&sdn=hartford&cdn=ci
tiestowns&tm=23&gps=237-1298_1O20545&f=00&su=p529.3.152.ipp554.2.15
O.ip-p284.5.420.ipp531.20.420.ip_&tt=2&bt=1&bts=l&zu=http%3A//www.cga.
ct.gov/2005/fc/2005SB-00963-R000379-FC.htm. However, the full impact on
employers that sponsor fully insured health care plans is yet to be clarified, as it
is not clear if they would have to pay for partners in civil unions, raising
thereby, the confusing conundrums marriage and civil union bring. There are
states with domestic partners laws. California enacted the State Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), via ballot initiative in 2000, even though it has domestic
partner laws. From a healthcare point of view, California requires all group
health care service plans to provide domestic partners with health coverage that
is equal to what spouses receive. In addition, it applies to health care coverage
offered by employers, not to self-insured health care coverage. What is not
clear, however, is whether California can require an employer that does not
offer domestic partner coverage to offer or subsidize such coverage when
providing an insured plan. In this context, it is worth noting that, California's
domestic partner law survived a legal challenge. Knight v. Superior Court, 26
Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). The state appellate court rejected
arguments that domestic partner law was the equivalent of marriage, in a case
where the plaintiffs said it violated California's DOMA. The state appellate
court ruled that domestic partnership was not equal to marriage. As a result, in
California, domestic partners are not eligible for some state marital benefits
and a wide range of federal benefits. As the Court held, "...the domestic-
partner law was not equal to marriage. The courts noted that partners are
ineligible for some state marital benefits and a wide range of federal benefits
and may be unable to get other states to recognize their relationships." Bob
Egelko, San Francisco
State's Domestic Partner Law Survives a Legal Challenge, S.F. CHRON., June
30, 2005, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/ca/2005/6/30/BAG22DGUC31.DTL.
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significant legal rights, which may include inheritance rights,
survivorship rights, medical rights, financial rights, and
property rights, amongst others.28  This disparity and
discrimination within the legal framework invites us to
analyze the social consequences of private actions from an
economic perspective. If economic protection regarding social
welfare is applied asymmetrically based on individual choice
of family, we must seek out the economic rationale behind
28. By using data from New Jersey residents in Census 2000 and using
experiences from other states, Lee Badgett and Bradley Sears were able to
quantify the likely fiscal effects of the Domestic Partnership Act (DPA). M.V.
LEE BADGErT & R. BRADLEY SEARS, EQUAL RIGHTS, FISCAL RESPONSIBILITIES:
THE FISCAL IMPACT ON AB205 CALIFORNIA BUDGET (2003),
http'//www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/AB205/AB205Studyl.pdf. According
to them, out of the rights and benefits provided to domestic partners in the
DPA, only three seem to have any fiscal significance: (i) the State will likely
save from $46 to $92 million in avoided public assistance expenditures; (ii)
covering the health insurance of same-sex domestic partners of state employees
and retirees will add approximately $1.8 million in state expenditures, not
withstanding the fact that making same-sex domestic partners eligible for
spousal survivor benefits will probably not result in any increase in state
expenditures; (iii) the State will also experience a loss in transfer inheritance
tax revenues in the range of $4.3 to $8.6 million. Badgett and Sears concluded
that the DPA will have a positive impact on the state budget. They further
noted that, even if their predictions about the State's savings from public
benefits is too high, their smallest estimate for those savings could be reduced
by two-thirds, and there would still be enough savings to off-set the highest
projections for the additional costs of providing state employees with same-sex
registered domestic partner health benefits and the potential loss in inheritance
tax revenues. Badgett and Sears concluded that the net impact of the DPA is
over $61 million in fiscal savings each year. Thus, the Domestic Partnership
Act will provide material support to many New Jersey families without placing
a strain on the state budget. See M.V. LEE BADGETT, & R. BRADLEY SEARS,
SUPPORTING FAMILIES, SAVINGS FUNDS: A FISCAL ANALYSIS OF NEW JERSEY'S
FAMILY EQUALITY ACT (2003),
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/NJ-DPAStudy.pdf" In
referring to third party impact, I focus on the issues related to children. Perhaps
no other entity is impacted so significantly than the children. Commentators
have noted that, "Children are the most important marital-specific asset and
one of the main advantages of the family." Christina Muller, An Economic
Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage, in 2002 GERMAN WORKING PAPERS IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 6 (2002). The author of the study presented a utilitarian viewpoint
of children as public goods for their parents, emphasizing the need for a stable
married relationship for the development of quality in their offspring. This,
therefore, established how marriage is a vital ingredient for the betterment of
the next generation of citizens. See also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 156 (5th ed. 1998) (describing a set of advantages arising out of
marriage); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children's
Rights: Incorporating Emerging Human Rights Into Constitutional Doctrine, 2
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (1999).
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such inequitable legal consequences. Furthermore, it is
important to understand whether there exists a rational basis
for imposing social cost on intimate behavior and to identify
whether such social cost imposes a stricter threshold of
accepted behavior within our contemporary societal
discourse.2 9
The benefit of using economics to illuminate marriage is
that this method allows us to analyze the social actions of
individuals through a dispassionate prism of cost-benefit
analysis. The neutrality of this economic analysis is not
shaped by a morality-laced, religion-biased social welfare
argument that extols the virtues of conservative family
structures.30  In order to conceptualize the broader
implication of the institution of marriage through economic
terms, I draw attention to the economic consequences of social
action. The analysis can be centered on finding if there are
negative consequences of extending marriage rights.
Consider at the outset the consequences of social outrage that
might be felt by the majority population in the event a
broader bundle of protective rights, which emanate from
marriage, is granted outside of heterosexual marriages.
Here, I view marriage as an institution which brings both a
reasonable expectation of economic protection, 31 as well as
maximization of economic benefits for the participants of the
institution.3 2  Despite the culmination of private decisions
borne out of humanity's inherent right to find its own
identity, marriage comes with legal consequences on account
of being amalgamated within the public welfare system.3
This immediate integration of two individuals allows for
spontaneous immersion within a protection paradigm defined
by a bundle of fiscal benefits and societal rights.34 There are
29. See John Fitzgerald, Marriage Prospects and Welfare Use, in MARRIAGE
AND THE ECONOMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETIES 177-97 (Shoshana A. Grossbard-Schectman ed. 2003).
30. See MARYANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991).
31. See generally Steven E. Landsburg, The Marriage Contract: Divorce Is
Just a Breakdown in Negotiations, SLATE, Sept. 12, 1997,
http://www.slate.com/id/2042.
32. Id.
33. Marriage brings with it an exclusive package of legal rights. By
protection mechanism, I refer to the plethora of benefits, from health care to tax
breaks that are accorded to both spouses within the marriage. All these rights
come via established laws in the jurisdiction of the married couple's domicile.
34. Existing law provides married couples with a slew of economic benefits
972 [Vo1:48
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many more benefits that a couple can extract from being
married than they would otherwise be able to receive in a
non-marital situation. These benefits, however, flow from the
government, as a legal consequence of the existing legal
paradigm. For example, by conferring upon a couple the
fiscal benefit of tax redistribution, the net gain transferred to
society is lowered, which the society must recoup via some
form of societal rent extraction.
Let us capture the protection paradigm of marriage with
further analysis. Protection paradigm unfolds itself under a
twin framework. Besides governmental grants of economic
benefits, under the existing legal framework, the more
economically solvent partner in a marriage becomes
economically responsible for taking care of the less
economically solvent partner. This protection mechanism
comes via a legal framework created to extend and expand
the institution of marriage with the premised goal to
propagate the family." This is also another contentious area
in today's contemporary discourse that I will explore in the
too numerous to each give mention. For example, married couples are entitled
to pay less tax compared to what they would pay separately. Since tax revenue
goes towards social welfare, the loss of revenue reflects as net economic loss to
society. In her article, Christina Muller suggests that by granting tax breaks
and legal benefits to the same-sex couples, the government is giving away
economic benefits that is not accompanied with any other economic benefits and
questions the justification of those added expenses by the government. I will
argue, however, that the additional cost borne by the government in providing
tax break in a same-sex marriage is more than compensated by the economic
gain obtained via stabilizing families through the recognition of marriage. See
Muller, supra note 28; see also M.V. Badgett, The Fiscal Impact on the State of
Vermont of Allowing Same-Sex couples to Marry, in IGLSS TECHNICAL REPORT
(1998); Jeffrey Escoffier, The Political Economy Of The Closet: Notes Toward An
Economic History of Gay and Lesbian Life Before Stonewall, in HOMO
ECONOMICS: CAPITALISM, COMMUNITY, AND LESBIAN AND GAY LIFE 123, 125
(Amy Gluckman & Betsy Reed eds., 1997); Nancy K. Kubasek, Kara Jennings &
Shannon T. Browne, Fashioning a Tolerable Domestic Partners Statute in an
Environment Hostile to Same-Sex Marriages, 7 L. & SEXUALITY 55 (1997).
35. When we live in a society, we have to abide by some of society's norms.
These norms sometimes could impinge upon our personal preferences,
restricting our freedom of choice and liberty of expression. Therefore, one
prerequisite for being part of a society is suppressing one's deeper desires and
intimate romantic aspirations. I argue here that, being subjected to this
suppression is equivalent to paying a societal rent. Since, only heterosexuals
are allowed to be part of married community, the societal rent is the
suppression of same-sex orientation. By paying that rent, persons can receive
the privilege of accompanying marriage rights.
36. See supra note 7.
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next section. Clearly, when two individuals are granted
rights that emanate from marriage, they extract economic
benefits, much like a corporation earning tax breaks. A
corporation gets the benefits of tax reduction for engaging in
its business. In return, the corporation is expected to impart
some social benefit to the society, such as enabling societal
members to earn their livelihoods. Similarly, because of
marriage-related tax benefits, society as a whole loses that
tax gain which results in a net economic loss to the society.
Thus, the society must extract some form of societal rent."
What would therefore, be the costs that must emerge as a
result of the benefits imparted on married couples?
A. Social Cost of Marriage: Outrage, Aversion and
Transference
From an economics perspective, there is no economic
consequence to society on account of opening marriage rights
outside of the heterosexual community. This is understood
through an analysis of the various cost drivers that could
impose social cost as a result of marriage. These costs can
come from (i) social outrage, (ii) aversion factor, and (iii)
transference effect.
1. Social Outrage
We begin the analysis by exploring the social outrage cost
because economics realigns resources by eventually engaging
in a social ordering. In such an ordering, the benefits
imparted upon individuals must include the equivalent cost
which has to be extracted from such individuals. This social
cost extraction does not take place in a premarital scenario, a
relationship condition in which no social-welfare-related
benefits are provided. Social cost extraction takes place
immediately after marriage by imposing on married couples a
set of behavioral norms .3  These are a bundle of restrictive
covenants, and not adhering to them could cause social
outrage. 9
37. See supra note 35.
38. Id.
39. Marriage brings with it a package of legal rights, which will not be
available otherwise. By social outrage, I draw attention to the social cost
society imposes upon the married couple for offering such plethora of benefits,
from health care to tax breaks, which are accorded to both spouses within the
974 [Vol:48
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When two individuals enter into a relationship without
the framework of marriage, no limit is placed on the
relationship either from a social ordering or from an
imposition of social cost point of view. When society loses
economic advantages, it must attempt to recoup some other
benefits from the individual, which could come via extraction
of societal cost from such an individual. This cost extraction
can manifest itself by restricting the individual from
engaging in a set of socially prohibited behavioral patterns.
It is important to note that these prohibited behavioral
patterns may not be legally impermissible in some
jurisdictions and therefore, the enforcement becomes
predicated on the imposition of social outrage. Not following
these behavior patterns could create social outrage from
fellow members of society, which in turn impedes the married
couple's pursuit of happiness. Once individuals enter into
marriage, they are prohibited from entering into multiple
romantic relationships or engaging in extramarital
relationships. These prohibitions or restrictions in behavior
are either mandated by explicit legal provisions, or prevented
by the imposition of societal outrage. In this way, social cost
is extracted from entities that enjoy rights of marriage, either
by means of legally sanctioned behavior, or by being subject
to societal outrage cost.
Implied in the concept of social outrage cost are the
societal dynamics that unfold themselves by imposing explicit
prohibitions on extending marriage benefits beyond
heterosexual individuals. Another way of looking at the
social cost extraction would be to view social cost as the
suppression of inherent desires, foregoing the right to one's
sexuality, and relinquishing an individual's right to a family.
I would argue that not extending the protective paradigm of
financial benefits and welfare rights to individuals outside of
the heterosexual community is driven by society's desire to
impose social outrage costs on those individuals. Society is
attempting to extract outrage costs by taking an opposing
view toward granting marriage rights to same-sex individuals
marriage. These benefits, however, do not come without attendant societal
behavioral norms by which the married couple must abide. When an individual
within marriage or the married couple themselves behave differently, they incur
society's outrage, which can be seen as a cost to be borne by married
individuals.
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or by not extending rights to individuals who are unwilling to
follow the path of a heterosexual couple's life.
2. Aversion Factor
Society opposes extending marriage-associated rights
outside of the heterosexual community due to aversion to
lifestyles that contradict the majority's view of a legitimate
lifestyle.4 ° Could this aversion impose sufficient social cost on
individuals which would preclude them from being integrated
within the broader protection paradigm of marriage rights?4
1
In my view, aversion should not be seen as a compelling
societal interest to shape issues of rights. Instead, aversion
to a lifestyle by the majority should be viewed as a clash of
two opposing lifestyles, each of which may have legitimate
reasons for proliferation. Furthermore, when significant
clashes in lifestyles emerge within the social framework, no
specific group's right must be curbed. Instead, the
determination of its affirmation or abrogation has to be
conducted at a more fundamental level. This calls for an
enquiry based on the individual's right to individuality,
premised on constitutional principles of equality, privacy, and
liberty. I would argue that aversion to a particularized way
of life, which does not encroach onto the prohibited confines of
egregious behavior, can in no way impose social costs upon
individuals involved in these alternative lifestyles. Therefore,
this cost driver should not be taken into consideration when
granting the protective umbrella of social welfare or
expanding of welfare benefits to individuals. Since society
neither has the right to regulate intimacy, nor the authority
to impose limits on private behavior, the aversion factor
based on a differing sexual proclivity than the majority
population should not be an avenue through which society
can impose social outrage cost.
3. Transference Effect
In its principled opposition to extending marriage rights
beyond heterosexual individuals,42 society routinely invokes
40. See supra note 7.
41. See supra note 34.
42. See Mackenzie Carpenter, What Happens to Kids Raised by Gay
Parents?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 10, 2007, available at
http'/www.post-gazette.com/pg/07161/793042-51.stm.
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transference effect as an element to impose social cost on
individuals. Transference effect can be defined as the
shaping effect young individuals might be exposed to as a
result of sustained and legitimized exposure to the same-sex
idealism. The proponents of this viewpoint argue that, with
the government's granting of those rights, it would also
legitimize same-sex relationships within the social
framework, ultimately colluding young impressionable minds
into accepting same-sex behavior as more fundamental
behavior. However, overwhelmingly, the existing biological
or social research indicates that homosexuality is neither
learned, nor acquired,43 calling into serious doubt the
legitimacy of the shaping effect on young people. Sociological
research further illustrates that the time frame between an
adolescent maturing into an adult and entering into a
meaningful relationship has increased over the years,44
exposing individuals to a plethora of choices4" and external
stimuli which would indeed nullify any shaping effect
incidents that homosexuality might have caused. Therefore,
the transference effect should be considered an inadequate
driver of imposing social outrage cost. I would argue,
therefore, that aversion does not provide a legitimate basis of
imposing social cost on individuals attempting to amalgamate
within the protective umbrella of social welfare protection. It
can be inferred, therefore, that social cost analysis does not
provide an adequate rationale for not granting marriage
rights beyond heterosexual couples.
43. On the topic of homosexuality, there are strong sentiments both for and
against. I will allow the reader to draw their own conclusion. Here, I argue this
is a behavior that can no longer be denied or labeled as a mental health issue.
To consider the biological aspect of homosexuality, see generally STEPHEN JAY
GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY (1977); J.M,
Bailey & R.C. Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, in 48
ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 1089-96 (1991). For many years the
psychiatric community had been labeling homosexuality as a sexual disorder.
However, based in part on research and on-going study of homosexual
individuals the organization removed homosexuality from DSM-III in 1973. See
generally Richard A. Isay, The Homosexual Analyst, in 46 PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDY OF THE CHILD 199-216 (1991).
44. See generally June Carbone, Age Matters: Class, Family Formation, and
Inequality, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2008) (on file with
author).
45. Id.
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B. Contract Paradigm Analysis
Setting aside the social cost element, I shall now consider
the institution of marriage through a contract paradigm
analysis. The concept of marriage has morphed from the
frozen inequalities of the medieval era as it embraced
elements of individual liberty and spousal equalities. Along
the way, its contractual construct has expanded within the
congruent limits of these liberating ideals. Thus, the very
institution can be viewed as a nexus of contract in which two
entities are in constant negotiation. These entities are bound
by a cascading array of incomplete contracts, embedded
within a larger contract, interconnected by asymmetric
preference between the two entities. This nexus is shaped,
therefore, by asymmetric incentives 46 and game-theoretic
decision making.47 Like the contract fundamentals, each
valid contract comes with the implicit premise of
performance.48 While this implicit premise of performance
remains intact, both the content and cost of that contract
46. Here, I draw attention to the phenomenon in which agents or entities
can affect the outcome of an event by tailoring their responses based on relative
preference between agents in a two-party game, or amongst agents in a multi-
party game. Our assumption in this standard economic model is that
individuals are rational and they are driven to maximize their expected utility.
Recent evidence suggests that some agents' utility depends on both their own
payoff and the payoffs of others. Therefore, an individual's satisfaction may
depend on how much she receives relative to those in a reference group. For an
excellent discussion of relative preference, see generally Michelle Alexopoulos &
Stephen Sapp, Exploring the Behavior of Economic Agents: The Role of Relative
Preferences, in 12 ECONOMICS BULL. 1-7 (2006) (discussing relative
preferences).
47. Here I draw attention to the interaction of couples in relationships, in
particular, marriage. Particularly, I want to explore this interaction between
individuals within the marriage, to meet their individual goals, while also
working for the ultimate good of the marriage relationship. To better
understand game-theoretic decision making, consider that:
Although game theory is relevant to parlor games such as poker or
bridge, most research in game theory focuses on how groups of people
interact. There are two main branches of game theory: cooperative and
noncooperative game theory. Noncooperative game theory deals
largely with how intelligent individuals interact with one another in an
effort to achieve their own goals.
David K. Levine, UCLA Department of Economics, What is Game Theory?,
http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/general/whatis.htm.
48. See Saby Ghoshray, Cyberspace Contracting: Embracing Incomplete
Contract Paradigm in the Wake of UCITA Experience, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 609 (2005) (explaining the concept of performance expectation in contract
formation).
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performance continually changes within marriage. I would
argue that marriage establishes contractual arrangements on
two fronts. While one contractual arrangement is between
the parties themselves, the other arrangement is between the
government and the couple.
To better understand the contractual framework
embodied in marriage, it is important to comprehend the
scope and limitation of the contractual construct of marriage,
which has expanded since the earliest marriages marked by
trade-offs and arrangement by elders to today's marriages in
which many resemble mergers by two competing themes of
individual liberty and spousal equality. While the contract
paradigm of marriage has legal significance, it also conveys a
significant deeper meaning. When we recognize the
contractual aspect of marriage, we also are drawn to
understand an individual's property interests as a derivative
of this contractual arrangement. By taking an expansive
view of marriage as a social contract, we can better
understand future implications of marriage on two grounds.
First, it will form a proper perspective of whether the idea of
marriage as applicable to other de facto cohabitating unions
beyond heterosexual marriage is inconsistent with this social
contract construct. Second, it will broaden the definitional
paradigm and place the institution of marriage on a firmer
conceptualization. Although the concept of matrimony can be
traced via its historical judicial interpretation between
heterosexual men and women, its construct has evolved due
to the continual legal consequences and the binding
contractual mechanism shaping its contours. As the shape
and form of intimate adult relationships multiply, the nature
of societal relationships evolve to such an extent that the
contractual obligations and legal protections of marriage take
a more expansive connotation.
Marriage can be viewed as a social contract centered on
two dimensions while providing specific legal consequences
and inheriting socio-economic impacts. These two dimensions
manifest themselves by the relationships between the
individuals involved in the marriage and by relationships
between the state and the married couple in question. The
socio-economic impact of marriage comes from the de jure
welfare protection mechanism accorded by the government
and the de facto third party implication presented by the
20081 979
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union. These contractual frameworks can encapsulate
various categories that range in differing prominence, such as
(i) no fault contract, in which the contracting parties can walk
away from the marriage obligation without showing any
cause for the break up, (ii) mutual consent contract, in which
the contracting individuals are mandated to enter into an
agreement for the dissolution of the contract, (iii) default
contract, where the state as a supervising authority will
impose its legal principles in the absence of explicit provisions
of premarital contract, and lastly, (iv) covenant marriage,
where both parties have to overcome a higher threshold or a
more-difficult hurdle for the dissolution of the contract due to
its binding nature.
Typically, in trying to expand upon the contractual
framework of marriage, the focus is given only on the implicit
promise of a performance,49 which the contract embodies
without abstracting the content and cost of that contract. It
is important to consider the basic factors that distinguish a
marriage contract from non-marital contracts. A marriage
resembles the mechanism of a corporation in that no one
contract defines marriage, but an array of cascading contracts
embedded within a larger contract 5° is nestled at the center of
a marital relationship. Since some of these contracts are
embedded within one another, the performance aspect of the
contract is dependent on the performance of another part of
the contract. Moreover, the success or failure of each of these
contracts is dependent on other factors. Such factors include
the asymmetry of economic incentives between the two
entities, relative preferences between contractual parties, and
game-theoretic decision making of the contractual parties
involved. All of these factors change as a function of time,
which in turn impacts the performance of the contract.
Without a doubt, two contractual relationships continue
to evolve within a marriage. These contracts emanate from
the relationships between the individual entities and the
relationship between the government and the contracting
couple. The success, failure, or the continuation of the
contractual relationship between the contractual couple
49. See id.
50. Id.
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depends on relative preference between the individuals. 1
This preference framework in turn is governed by asymmetric
economic incentives, which in turn is shaped and evolved in
time by game-theoretic decision making by the individuals.52
This renders the contractual arrangement within the
marriage between the participants very complex.
Furthermore, due to the contract performance's dependence
on economic preference, game-theoretic decision making, and
the composition of incomplete contracts, this relationship
could be best described as an incomplete paradigm.
On the contrary, the relationship between the
government and the couple is straightforward in nature, as it
is based on expectation of performance on both ends. Upon
formation of a legal relationship by marriage, the government
enters into a contract with the couple. According to the
performance expectation arising out of the contract, the
government extends both a bundle of rights and a set of
protections to the married entity. Thus, marriage forms an
entity which creates legal rights and social responsibilities
along with various legal consequences through its formation.
This entity inherits performance expectation and incurs legal
consequences as a prerequisite of its existence within
society. 5 3
The social cost analysis provides adequate illumination
about the economic consequences of social action to dispel the
notion that expanding marriage rights to a broader
community cannot be invalidated on grounds of social
outrage. The contract paradigm analysis places the burden
away from discussions on gender complimentarity and sexual
orientation. Economic analysis based on contract formation
rejects the exclusivity of marriage based on criteria borne out
of sexual orientation or gender preference.54 Clearly, the
fulfillment of an entity-agency relationship between the dyad
and the government is neither based on sex, nor dependent on
gender. While the dyad inherits some responsibility and
accepts the imposition of social cost, it in turn comes under
the protection umbrella offered by the government. Thus,
there is no basis for either gender complimentarity or sexual
51. See supra note 46.
52. See supra note 47.
53. See supra note 48.
54. See discussion supra Part II.
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preference to be a necessary or sufficient condition for such a
legal entity, which can gain all of the rights and benefits
enjoyed by heterosexual unions.
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING FAMILY: GOING BEYOND
THE DEFINITIONAL CONUNDRUM
Implicit in this enquiry thus far is the recognition that
granting marriage rights may not be the exclusive province of
heterosexual couples. This is evident in that neither the
social cost argument, nor the contractual framework analysis
supports such exclusivity. If so, then what is missing? The
answer comes from extricating the definition of family from
the archaic inequalities of eighteenth century puritan beliefs
and honoring an expanded conception of family which
adequately encompasses all types of family structures.
Against the backdrop of a definitional conundrum regarding
the meaning of family, an expanded definition of family is a
necessary condition to broaden the existing frontiers of family
law. Surely, this would be a significant step forward.
Historically, marriage and the concept of family have
been intertwined in all socio-legal discussions.5 Anchored in
the basic premise of a stable family is the precursor to a
viable democracy.56 The definitional construct of family
gained currency under the conventional framework of the
mother-father dyad is the backbone of family law. Although
marginal expansion of social welfare rights 7  and
supplemental enhancement of fiscal protection has taken
place in the evolution of family law within the last couple of
55. See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE (1988) (describing the marriage
behaviors of the new Pilgrim immigrants, whose marriages were controlled and
arranged by the parents controlling their children as a source of family income,
through dowries and inheritance, marriages helped increase family bonds and
the ties through intermarriage of first cousins, as well as brothers and sisters
were valuable to facilitate the family wealth, status and political ambitions).
56. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 22 (asserting that society seeks to
maximize its value by incorporating and implementing visions of a family
premised in the traditional concept of marriage as the heterosexual union
between man and woman, who would eventually form the father-mother dyad
as the epicenter of a traditional family).
57. Samir Luther, Human Rights Campaign Found., Domestic Partner
Benefits: Employer Trends and Benefits Equivalency for the GLBT Family
(2006), available at http'//www.hrc.orgdocuments/Guide-to-Employer-Trends-
and-Benefits-Equivalency-for-the-GLBT-Family.pdf.
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decades,58 it has not altered significantly the legal bastion
premised on conventional family values. Conservative voices
contend that the government should promote marriage as
only the union between man and woman.5 9 According to this
viewpoint, father-mother dyad is considered the only proxy
for the most stable family structure.6 0 As such, maximization
of social welfare comes from the stabilizing effect of a
conventional family which only heterosexual couples,61
delineated by gender complimentarity and characterized by
heterosexual orientation, can provide. However, the recent
explosion of alternative family structures fosters the converse
of such a viewpoint,62 and therefore, we must reject the notion
that heterosexual households are the only privileged place
from where family values spring forth.
I would argue that the viewpoint drawn from the
historical text to define "marital family as the generator of
domestic habits"63 fails to represent the full range of family
structures. With a growing array of family forms fully
capable of fostering family members into both intimate and
nurturing relationships, this assertion is squarely outdated. 4
58. Thomas Coleman, Domestic Partner Benefits Are Inevitable (Jan. 9,
2006),
http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/columnone/domestic-partner-benefits-are in
evitable.htm.
59. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15
J.L. & POL. 581, 627-32 (1999); David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan,
Reaffirming Marriage: A Presidential Priority, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 623,
640 (2001).
60. See Wardle, supra note 22.
61. Id. at 371-72 (noting that society seeks to attain maximum value by
promoting family virtues through heterosexual marriage).
62. See generally id. For traditional marriage views which idolize
heterosexual marriage as the "seedbed of civic virtue," see, COUNCIL ON CIVIL
SOCIETY, A CALL To CIVIL SOCIETY (1998) [Hereinafter COUNCIL]; NAT'L
COMM'N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: How CIVIC
DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (1998)
(extolling the virtues of two-parent heterosexual families and calling for the
reduction in teenage and non-marital births); Mary Ann Glendon, Forgotten
Questions, in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE 3 (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn
eds., 1995) (observing some consensus among commentators who identify the
recent phenomenon of "weakening of child-raising families" as negatively
contributing to the development of virtuous citizens); see generally GLENDON,
supra, note 30 (arguing that contemporary rights discussions subsume the role
of civil society in inculcating the virtues necessary for ordered liberty).
63. See id at 107-08, COUNCIL.
64. See Roger Rubin, Alternative Lifestyles Today: Off the Family Studies
Screen, in HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY FAMILIES 32, 33 (Marilyn Coleman &
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Today's alternative family structures are fully capable of
accomplishing, through mutual support and interdependence,
the awesome responsibility of nurturing children into
adulthood.65 These alternative families are fully equipped to
realize the full potential of every individual, and create
productive and bona fide citizens. Therefore, the hackneyed
concept of marital family as the only capable entity to become
the foundational unit of society needs historic revision.
Implicit within this particularized vision of family is the
primitive understanding of societal welfare, based on
transference of virtuous qualities through both mother and
father. The question that arises is whether this construct is
still applicable. The ensuing enquiry then becomes more
poignant against a broader and expanding conception of
liberty and diverging ideals of family formation.
While defending traditional marriage, some
commentators have pleaded not to change the domestic habits
of the American people while emphasizing the role of
marriage in constituting virtuous citizens. 6  These
commentators have defined marital family as the "seedbed of
republican civic virtue."67 According to such viewpoints,
reconceptualizing family and redefining the marital construct
would alter American domestic habits, which would lead to
radical revisionism of the Constitution's basic premises,
ultimately resulting in structural changes in the government
within a very short time frame.6  This implies in no
Lawrence Ganong eds., 2004) (establishing that same-sex marriage laws
threaten the dyadic restriction on marriage because in order for same-sex
couples to have children without resorting to adoption they must necessarily
involve a third person in order to conceive and bear a child, which will
eventually transform the dyadic relationship into an asymmetric triadic
formation).
65. Harry Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same-
Sex - Or Not At All? 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 284-85 (2000); see also RELATIVE
VALUES: RECONFIGURING KINSHIP STUDIES (Sara Franklin & Susan McKinnon,
eds., 2001); Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in
UNDOING GENDER 102, 130 (2004) (espousing the deconstruction of the concept
of natural parent and kinship relations); see generally Janet L. Dolgin, Choice,
Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family,
32 CONN. L. REV. 523 (2000); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention:
Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 597 (2002).
66. See generally, supra note 62.
67. See Glendon, supra note 62.
68. See Wardle, supra note 22, id at 361-365.
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unmistakable terms that one of the basic impediments in
going beyond the conventional concept of marriage and
redefining marriage is to overcome unsubstantiated fears of
losing traditions and norms known to the majority
population. While the world outside of the United States is
embracing the changes in the diverging conceptions of
family69  and incorporating within their constitutional
jurisprudence the rights and benefits of all types of family
structures, ° constitutional jurisprudence in the United States
continues to repudiate these much-needed changes. It still
clings to this particular vision of family consisting of a dyad of
husband-wife with gender complimentarity. Although
domestic partnerships and civil unions highlight the
advancement in recognizing rights of individuals with
alternative desires in some states,71 the legal revolution
within the broader United States has remained stagnant. 2
Barring a few states such as Vermont, 73 Massachusetts, 7 and
New Jersey,75 the courts and legislatures have failed to
broaden the institution of marriage, and thus failed to
enhance the concept of marriage to comport with
constitutional commitments to individual liberty and equal
citizenship.
Neither same-sex marriage rights, nor the economic
protection for alternative families have progressed in-step
with the explosion of family structures long in vogue within
the country. Although marriage in general has moved from a
hierarchical-based to an equity-based framework, it has not
gone beyond the gender complimentarity and sex-based
69. See Maxwell, supra note 9.
70. Id.
71. See Wood & Duck, supra note 16.
72. See Wikipedia, supra note 23.
73. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that same-sex
couples must have the same benefits that opposite-couples have, thus the
Legislature created the civil union laws to comply with the mandate).
74. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that restricting same-sex couples from the privileges of marriage was
unconstitutional, the Court in 2004 also held that civil unions were not
sufficient in meeting the mandate, therefore on May 17, 2004 the state of
Massachusetts was the first in the United States to approve same-sex
marriages).
75. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (holding that same-sex couples
must receive the same rights and benefits opposite-sex couples were
guaranteed, in December 2006, the Legislature then enacted a civil union
statute to comply with the ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court).
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discriminatory framework. In my view, keeping the gender
complimentarity within marriage does more harm in its
continuation of the gender-based schism. It would, on the
contrary, be better if gender diversity and sexual preference
is given entry into reconceptualizing family boundaries. After
all, family diversity is an irreversible feature of the post-
modern family landscape and the legal paradigm must
encapsulate that reconceptualization.
IV. THE RIGHT TO INDIVIDUALITY, SELF AND THE
CREATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Thus far, I have established that the restrictive covenant
of marriage does not flow from the economic consequence of
social action, nor does it emanate from any prohibition within
the contractual paradigm of marriage. Thus, I see no reason
for not expanding the protective paradigm of marriage beyond
the existing framework. Further, I do not see any compelling
national interest for not redefining and reconceptualizing the
definition of family. I shall, therefore, move beyond the
definitional construct of family and the economic prism, and
attempt to realign the current issue within the constitutional
framework.
Lost amidst the discussion of social cost and economic
impact of marriage is the analysis of fundamental rights
determination. The rights to a protective paradigm
emanating from legal consequences of marriage should be
viewed through a more fundamental analysis of human
existence. The enquiry must revolve around whether
individuals coming from alternative family structures have
the fundamental right of economic and social protection from
the society. However, before examining how far the contours
of this right can extend, I will frame the discussion at a more
granular level. The determination of this right should
emanate from a deeper understanding of human existence,
seen through an expanded abstraction of human individuality
and inherent dignity. This inquiry can be constructed around
a set of well-defined questions: Is the drive for homosexuality
anchored in the pursuit of a meaningful existence in the
universe? Is adherence to an alternative family structure a
necessary component for fulfilling human individuality? In
my view, an attempt to understand human individuality will
inevitably lead to a determination of whether retention of
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one's own individuality can be encapsulated within a
fundamental rights discourse. What then, is the definition of
individuality?
Individuality is part and parcel of the right to define
one's own existence. Individuality flows through a set of
inherent desires, manifested via a set of actions. The right to
individuality could be seen as an inalienable right of an
individual, as long as his or her actions do not come in conflict
with other persons' rights to individuality. Individuality is
therefore protected by a zone of privacy, driven by an
individual pursuit of happiness, and manifested in one's own
definition of self. This definition of self evolves through a set
of social actions and solidified via a series of life events.
Therefore, a person's individuality is also revealed through
her sexuality, established by her choice of companionship,
solidified by her desire to assimilate within a family, and
validated via entitlement to a right to legacy. In most
individuals, this legacy evolves through inheriting children,
either by biological procreation or by means of adoption.
Attaining one's own individuality, therefore, requires
obtaining a bundle of rights. These rights will guarantee the
person's right to happiness that emanates from one's
expression of sexuality and living in a meaningful
relationship within a desired family and obtaining children.
A set of social actions flow through the desires identified
above, each of which can be particularized and encapsulated
within the larger body of family law as some specific right of
an individual. By granting an individual a collective
framework of all these rights, the said individual is enabled
to define one's self. The enquiry therefore, centers on
determining the nature of these rights. Is the pursuit of
finding one's self or trying to create one's individuality a
fundamental right? Although not explicitly articulated in the
Constitution,76 could they be unenumerated rights?7 Since
76. The Bill of Rights contains numerous rights called enumerated rights,
which are different than unenumerated rights. While the enumerated rights
are explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the unenumerated rights have not
been explicitly mentioned, but the Supreme Court has long held that the
Constitution protects those rights. The difficulty in distinguishing between
enumerated rights and unenumerated rights has created significant
constitutional confusion. Unenumerated rights are retained by the people.
Commenting on unenumerated rights, Randy Barnett says, "The purpose of the
Ninth Amendment was to ensure that all [enumerated and unenumerated]
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all these rights are essential components to fulfill one's
destined individuality, could we identify an umbrella of
unenumerated rights to self, which ought to be
constitutionally protected? In my view, this fog of confusion
arising from an erroneous recognition of unenumerated rights
could best be eradicated by further irradiating the contours of
constitutional protection.
The fallacy of enumerated rights stems from the belief
that the only protected rights are those that are explicitly
mandated in the Constitution.78 Under this fallacy, rights
that are not specifically mentioned must not be construed as
protected rights7 9 and therefore, their existence depends on
individual natural rights had the same stature and force after some of them
were enumerated as they had before; and its existence argued against a
latitudinarian interpretation of federal powers." See Randy Barnett, The Ninth
Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Texas Law Review 1 (2006), id at 13.;
see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2006) (asserting that these rights come from a broad principle of
equality and democratic process).
77. The Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution addresses
rights of the people that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. As
part of the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment reads, "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." Justice Arthur Goldberg, Chief Justice Warren,
and Justice Brennan expressed the opinion that the Ninth Amendment is
relevant to interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This opinion is
reflected in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965):
[T]he Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be
construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights .... I do not
mean to imply that the .... Ninth Amendment constitutes an
independent source of rights protected from infringement by either the
States or the Federal Government .... While the Ninth Amendment -
and indeed the entire Bill of Rights- originally concerned restrictions
upon federal power, the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the States as well from abridging fundamental personal
liberties. And, the Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all such
liberties are specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments, is
surely relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental personal
rights, now protected from state, as well as federal, infringement.
Id. at 490-91. The concurring opinion is available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC CR_0381_0479_ZC.html.
78. Id.
79. Consider a noteworthy commentary by Randy Barnett. He describes
this presumption of liberty:
As long as they do not violate the rights of others (as defined by the
common law of property, contract and tort), persons are presumed to be
"immune" from interference by government. This presumption means
that citizens may challenge any government action that restricts their
otherwise rightful conduct, and the burden is on the government to
show that its action is within its proper powers or scope. At the
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the vagaries of governmental decision or juridical invocation.
The history of the Framing period indicates not only were the
Framers concerned about protecting some rights from federal
assault,"° but also recognized that they may not have
conceived of the entire suite of rights that future descendants
might require for perpetuation of their meaningful
existence.8' Therefore, explicit enlisting of some rights in the
form of enumerated rights does not mean that there are some
rights that may not be constitutionally protected. This is
echoed in the Ninth Amendment which reads: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." 2  The Ninth Amendment was clearly designed to
grant security to certain rights that were not envisioned, but
perhaps would flow from the sociological development of the
future generations. This was noted by James Madison:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that by
enumerating particular exceptions for the grant of power
it would disparage those rights which were not placed in
national level, the government would bear the burden of showing that
its acts were both "necessary and proper" to accomplish an enumerated
function, rather than, as now, forcing the citizen to prove why it is he
or she should be left alone. At the state level, the burden would fall
upon state government to show that legislation infringing the liberty of
its citizens was a necessary exercise of its "police power" -that is, the
state's power to protect the rights of its citizens ....
See Randy Barnett, A Ninth Amendment For Today's Constitution, 26
Valparaiso University Law Review 419 (1991), id at 432.
80. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788) (expressing concerns that rights may be reserved in a manner in which
federal powers are granted), available at
http://www.constitution.org/jm/17881017_tj.htm; Letter from James Madison to
George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789) (noting the existence of a dividing line
between the powers granted and the rights retained does not necessarily
preclude abridgement of any legitimate rights via non-enumeration), available
at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammemnmjmtext:field(DOCID+@lit(jm050127)).
81. Harvard historian Bernard Bailyn captured the Ninth Amendment's
connotation of encompassing unspecified rights in the future, when he observed
that the Ninth Amendment refers to, "a universe of rights, possessed by the
people - latent rights, still to be evoked and enacted into law . . . a reservoir of
other, unenumerated rights that people retain, which in time may be enacted
into law." Bernard Bailyn, Remarks at White House Millennium Evening
(2000), available at
http://clinton2.nara.gov/Initiatives/Millennium/bbailyn.html.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See also generally Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-
Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008).
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that enumeration: and it might follow by implication, that
those rights which were not singled out, were intended to
be assigned into the hands of the general government, and
were consequentially insecure.8 3
The promise of the Ninth Amendment is found in its
rejection of the inference that by listing certain rights, other
rights would lack protection. 4 The Constitution does not
prohibit the expansion of some rights to isolated minorities
within the society, even if an existential analysis supports
formation of such rights. We must then determine whether
denial of this umbrella of rights to a meaningful existence
prevents the individuals in question from finding their
individuality and more importantly, their self.
Before determining whether the right to one's self and
the retention of one's individuality falls under fundamental
rights, we must trace the constitutional trajectory based on
tradition and historical development in law. The pursuit of
determining one's self must be insulated from federal
encroachment and thus protected by a halo of privacy. The
right to privacy is protected as long as that privacy
component is not encroaching into a domain marked off-limits
by law. Although the right to self has a privacy component by
the very nature of this right, it is debatable if this right can
be fully secured under a privacy analysis. Constitutional
jurisprudence, from Griswold v. Connecticut 5 to Lawrence v.
83. James Madison, Speech Introducing the Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789),
available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill-of rightssll.html.
84. Such examples of interpretation of the Constitution are found in The
Federalist Papers. The writers of the Federalist Papers intended to both
influence ratification and future interpretations of the Constitution. The
original eighty-five articles were compiled and formed the Federalist Papers,
which urged the ratification of the United States Constitution. They were
published beginning in October 1787. The Federalist Papers serve as an
important constitutional interpretive tool, as they outline the philosophy and
motivation of the newly formed government. The Federalist papers are
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html.
85. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). (holding that the
Constitution protected the right to privacy). The ruling was based on an 1879
Connecticut law, which was virtually never enforced. Id. The law prohibited
the use of contraceptives or drugs that were for the sole purpose of preventing
conception. Id. Justice Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion, relying on the
Ninth Amendment to support his findings. Justice Harlan wrote a concurring
opinion in which he relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Due Process
Clause. Id. Justice Byron White also relied on the Due Process Clause in his
concurrence. Id. Since Griswold, the Supreme Court has cited the right to
990 [Vo1:48
20081 EXPANSION OF FAMILY RIGHTS 991
Texas, 6 has reshaped the privacy law, morphing from
Griswold's "penumbra of privacy"s' to Lawrence's "zone of
privacy.""8 Although Griswold elevated the concept of privacy
from discrete individualized restrictions on government
actions to providing an expanding protective umbrella of self
autonomy, I question if Griswold's privacy necessarily
encompasses rights to self and individuality. Rather, I see
the right to human individuality as recognized under
Lawrence's illumination of the zone of privacy. Recognized
within the confines of human existence, this privacy is so
fundamental and so secure that no legislative invalidation or
governmental institution should be allowed within that zone.
Griswold's privacy jurisprudence, penned by Justice Douglas,
comes via assertion of a definite right, while collectively
emerging from the various Amendments, 9 or finding life
under the constitutional glosses of the Fourteenth 90 and the
Ninth Amendments, 91 or buried in the penumbras 92 of the
individual Amendments. According to Justice Harlan,
privacy in several rulings, most notably, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In
Roe, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion was a private decision between a
woman and her doctor. Id. For the most part, the Court in the subsequent
rulings relied on Justice Harlan's substantive due process opinion. See id. The
Griswold cases as well as other Supreme Court cases are available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/htm/historicsUSSC_CR_0381_0479_ZS.html.
86. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
87. See supra note 81.
88. See Lash, supra note 82.
89. In Griswold, Justice Douglas expanded the constitutional contours of
privacy rights by first drawing specific guarantees within the Bill of Rights and
using expanded abstractions of various amendments to give substantive
credence to those guarantees. According to Justice Douglas, "The foregoing
cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment, in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the
consent of the owner, is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment, in its self-incrimination clause, enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
90. See supra note 89.
91. See id.
92. See id.
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however, this privacy right naturally emanates from the
Constitution's fidelity to substantive due process and thus
may invalidate legislative statutes prohibiting certain
intimate behaviors." Thus, the privacy of Griswold does not
announce the creation of new rights. Yet, it becomes
problematic in recognizing an expanded abstraction of rights,
which must emanate in contradiction to existing statutory
prohibitions. In order to develop a meaningful framework to
understand the right to individuality, I shall therefore shift
the analysis from a privacy-centric framework to a liberty-
based discussion.
Washington v. Glucksberg94 transforms the privacy
jurisprudence to liberty jurisprudence, while ascertaining
certain fundamental rights based on historical tradition.
However, Glucksberg's difficulty comes from the recognition
that certain social actions may not comport with historical
tradition, while attempting to expand the contours of
fundamental rights for individuals. Regardless, the purely
fundamental rights analysis seems consistent with the
Glucksberg jurisprudence, when the privacy doctrine is
expanded into fundamental rights abstraction predicated on a
liberty interest. This assertion of a liberty component and an
expanded abstraction of privacy can be traced back to
constitutional jurisprudence, given life from various Justices,
most notably by Justice Brandeis, according to whom, the
right to privacy flows from the inviolable right to self.95
93. This is seen in Justice Harlan's conception of the right to privacy as the
constitutional right that is ensconced in "the concept of ordered liberty," such
that any statute that violates the basic tenants of such "ordered liberty" is
infringing on the rights to privacy. Thus, according to Justice Harlan, right of
privacy is one of these basic values that emanates from "the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment," which can be achieved "only by continual
insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that
the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing
and preserving American freedoms." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
94. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
95. On the issue of privacy, Justice Brandeis observed:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
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Therefore, going beyond privacy allows for defining the scope
and contours of liberty within the explicit guarantees of the
Constitution, which in turn provide answers to fundamental
questions intricately related to the pursuit of individuality.
This manifestation of individuality is predicated upon the
assertion of the individual's right to inherent dignity and the
pursuit of the individual's right to happiness. Pursuit of
happiness collectively emanates from the basic building
blocks of defining one's self. This framework dictates that an
individual should have the right to (i) express his or her
sexuality, (ii) choose a companion according to one's sexual
orientation, (iii) form a family which can provide a
meaningful relationship, and (iv) nurture children according
to one's desire, as long as these actions and choices do not
come in conflict with others' rights to meaningful existence
and pursuit of self.
This right to pursue happiness and fulfillment of one's
own inherent dignity must also encompass the right to shape
and define one's legacy by meaningful interaction with an
individual's descendent. That means, an individual is free to
exert one's self, free to define one's own individuality, and will
have all the rights to have children and raise these children
within his or her own home, as long as that behavior does not
encroach into legal bounds. In order for these rights to have a
meaningful gloss of fundamental rights, the courts have to
get involved in the business of identifying specific
fundamental rights. The enquiry should revolve around
whether these rights flow from the recognition of specific
individual needs, as a result of sociological development, or
whether these rights emanate as specific fundamental rights.
Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Glucksberg further
illuminates this dilemma.96 According to Justice Souter's
Glucksberg framework, once a fundamental right is
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as
evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such
intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
96. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752 (Souter, J. concurring).
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identified, its lack of recognition could be justified only if
assertion of such right goes against a compelling government
interest." If such a right does not infringe on governmental
interests, it may be enshrined as a fundamental right under
the liberty interest guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Let us analyze how the present issue is illuminated
under the constitutional development discussed above. If we
were to expand rights flowing from legal marriage to
individuals outside of heterosexual marriage, the derivative
legal consequences could unravel in various ways. This could
bestow upon homosexual couples social welfare protection at
par with married heterosexual individuals. This could
provide a transgendered individual right to raise children. If
all these actions are the necessary precondition to live in
meaningful relationships for the furtherance of the
individual's self and for the continuation of a person's
individuality, how should the constitutional jurisprudence
treat this? I am drawn to Justice Souter's key observation in
Glucksberg:
The weighing or the valuing of contending interests in this
sphere is only the first step, forming the basis for
determining whether the statute in question falls inside or
outside the zone of what is reasonable in the way it
resolves the conflict between the interests of state and
individual. ... It is only when the legislation's justifying
principle, critically valued, is so far from being
commensurate with the individual interest as to be
arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the statute must
give way.98
Drawing from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
Ullman,99 Justice Souter engages in a substantive due process
analysis once a particular interest of an individual is
identified. 1° Here, Justice Souter calls for explicit balancing
of the interests of the individual against the state's
interest. 101 Clearly, primacy is given to the individual's
interest, while keeping the state's interest at a marginal
level, unless a compelling state interest can be asserted.
97. Id. at 768.
98. Id. at 770.
99. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
100. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, at 771.
101. Id. at 771.
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The analysis in the above context must proceed through a
series of enquiries to identify whether prohibitive legislation
could block the furtherance of individual rights. For example,
would disallowing retirement benefits to homosexual couples,
at par with married heterosexuals, stymie their pursuit of
happiness and, in the process, limit meaningful existence in
life? Could legislative prohibition against transgendered
adoption deconstruct the inherent dignity of that individual
by not allowing a family to raise a child, and in the process,
interfering with that individual's right to happiness? These
are the frameworks that we must consider before identifying
fundamental rights of individuals within alternative families.
These are deeply fundamental and extremely poignant issues
related to individual existence. Individuality must be
ascertained via careful analysis of the weight of inherent
dignity of defining of one's self and the importance of the
pursuit of happiness in prospering one's individuality. Thus,
a shifting norm in the privacy component and an expanded
conception of the liberty component will aid in the
determination of defining what fundamental right is being
denied. In this context, Justice Souter believes Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman can provide a guidepost. In
Washington v. Glucksberg, Justice Souter noted:
[SIuch review is not the identification of extratextual
absolutes, but scrutiny of a legislative resolution . . . of
clashing principles, each quite possibly worthy in of itself,
but each to be weighed within the history of our values as
a people .... Thus informed, judicial review still has no
warrant to substitute one reasonable resolution of the
contending positions for another, but authority to
supplant the balance already struck between the
contenders only when it falls outside the realm of
reasonable. 102
Nowhere do we see the manifestation of "clashing
principles" of family values more poignant than in the current
debate of granting marriage rights beyond conventional
families. While one side is extolling the virtues of a
conventional family unit as the abiding principle for the
furtherance of societal welfare, the other side is trying to find
and redefine their existence in the universe by following the
102. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 764 (Souter, J., concurring).
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call of their biological construct and finding it difficult to
pursue a meaningful existence in this universe under the
same protective umbrella of the law. Doesn't this call for
juridical scrutiny of a legislative principle which perhaps
cannot provide resolution to these clashing principles of
conception of family? This clashing principle will continue to
shape the contemporary socio-legal discourse as long as
definitional confusion of "family" remains within our
sociological framework. This beckons us to invoke informed
judicial review, which must comport via reasonable analysis
based on careful scrutiny to identify what constitutes pursuit
of happiness. If this pursuit of happiness is tied to defining
one's individuality, which in turn can be traced to defining
one's self and inherent dignity, let us bestow upon our fellow
humans the basic fundamental right enshrined in the
Constitution, which has long remained unattainable to some.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
By shifting away from a same-sex marriage rights
discussion, my article argues for a broader expansion of social
welfare protection for non-traditional families. In this
context, the relationship between marriage and rights come
from the fact that the rights argued here typically emanate
from the legal consequences of marriage. I do, however,
delineate between marriage rights and a broader umbrella of
rights that provide social welfare protection. Distinguishing
between marriage rights and marriage-like economic rights is
important for a myriad of reasons. First, the invocation of
marriage evokes a strong sentiment in the public foray. It
may happen that contemporary discourse on marriage may
subsume the more fundamental issue of attaining rights.
Second, the objective of expanding rights is to broaden the
protective umbrella of social welfare to families, which may
consist of adults living in meaningful love relationships, for
which marriage may not have any importance in the
traditional sense. Therefore, the focus must be on the
recognition of families, and securing their right to social
welfare for the betterment and continuation of all family
structures.
Looking through the prism of economic consequences at
social actions has indicated that there cannot be a social cost
associated with granting marriage rights. Although I do not
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argue for expansion of marriage rights in this article, I
engage in an analysis based on social outrage cost and
contractual framework of marriage to drive home the premise
that sexual preference or gender distortion does not pose
impediments for marriage contracts to formulate. In the
same way, the formation of a love relationship is not
dependent on sexual preference or gender complimentarity.
The broader scope of contract framework and the invalidation
of social outrage doctrine provide a stronger rationale to
reconceptualize the definition of family. I argue, therefore,
that the time has come to extricate the hackneyed definition
of family from the frozen inequalities of the father-mother
dyad. In the same respect, an emerging definition must
incorporate the hopes and desires of all types of individuals,
who aspire to live in a meaningful relationship to pursue
their happiness. It is implicit that in an expanded conception
of family resides the promise of securing multiple rights of
economic protection, which flow from the framework of family
laws.
Finally, my article seeks to find fundamental rights in
the expansion of social welfare rights of non-traditional
families. Tracing the constitutional contours of privacy,
liberty, and equality, I propose to expand the frontiers of
unenumerated rights for non-traditional individuals living in
alternative families by drawing upon humanity's eternal
aspirations. I argue that, implicit within a person's search for
his or her individuality, resides the yearning to find one's own
self, and the desire to define one's own conception of family.
This desire, this aspiration, is an unalienable right, secured
within a halo of privacy opaque to existing laws, insulated
from federal assaults and thus, must be recognized.
Recognizing such rights does not require invalidation of
settled laws, and does not require encroaching upon the
rights of other individuals, but it does require a deeper
understanding of the individual's right to existence within the
meaning of democratic constitutionalism. The resounding
clarion call urges expanding the contours of rights for all
individuals, which shall guarantee a meaningful existence to
all persons, and in turn creating sound and stable family
structures across the United States.
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